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Can State Law Remedies Revive Statutes Stricken
by ERISA’s Preemption Provision?
Justin A. Kesselman*
Since the United State Supreme Court’s holding in Egelhoff that ERISA preempts state law revocation-on-divorce statutes, courts and legal
scholars have attempted to fashion a way to apply the policies of these
statutes to effect the presumed intent of an employee not to provide retirement plan benefits to a former spouse. This paper analyzes those efforts
and contrasts the statutory remedy suggested in the Uniform Probate
Code with the common law remedy of imposing a constructive trust on
the recipient of those benefits. In this author’s view, the constructive trust
is the sounder approach, because it preserves the presumption embedded
in ERISA that an ex-spouse’s continued presence in the plan documents is
an expression of the participant’s intent. Although the statutory approach
will often produce a similar result, it fundamentally changes the nature of
the remedy by flipping the presumption and making it irrebuttable. By
replacing a federal rule that errs on the side of the spouse with a state rule
that errs against the spouse, the statutory remedy seems more likely to fall
within ERISA’s preemptive scope.
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INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) is a comprehensive federal law regulating the administration of
employee benefit plans.1 ERISA contains an express preemption provision, causing the statute to supersede any and all state laws relating to
qualified plans.2 Another critical provision in the statute requires plan
administrators to distribute plan benefits to the beneficiary named in
the plan documents.3 But where the plan’s beneficiary form names an
ex-spouse, state “revocation-on-divorce” statutes that apply to qualified
retirement plans essentially instruct the plan administrator to pay someone else—a beneficiary determined under state law.4 In Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, the United States Supreme Court held that such
revocation-on-divorce statutes are preempted by ERISA, because they
directly conflict with ERISA’s instructions and interfere with its underlying policy of uniform plan administration.5
Most states have a revocation-on-divorce statute on the books.6
These statutes provide that any provision in a will directing benefits to a
surviving spouse is revoked by operation of law upon divorce as if the
legatee had pre-deceased.7 In several states, as well as in the Uniform
Probate Code, revocation-on-divorce statutes also reach nonprobate
death-time transfers.8 The fact that an ex-spouse was never removed as
the named beneficiary may be attributable to a variety of factors, includ1 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(2006) [hereinafter ERISA].
2 Id. § 1144(a).
3 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
4 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 142 (2001).
5 Id. at 148.
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1,
cmt. o, illus. 12 (2012).
7 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 551 (2012).
8 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2) (2010); Susan Gary, Applying RevocationOn-Divorce Statutes to Will Substitutes, 18 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 83, 102 (2004).
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ing procrastination, forgetfulness, or untimely death.9 The policy underlying these statutes is simple: to codify the presumption that most
decedents would not want their ex-spouse to take at death.10 While this
state public policy justification is compelling, Egelhoff teaches that it is
insufficient to override a directly competing federal policy embodied in
a federal statute.11
Dissatisfaction with this result has given rise to two significant approaches that attempt to circumvent ERISA’s preemption of revocation-on-divorce statutes. The first is the application of the common law
remedy of constructive trusts. Under this approach, the plan administrator pays the named beneficiary, but courts retain the power to impose
a constructive trust on the proceeds and order the recipient beneficiary
to deliver the funds to another in equity.12 Alternatively, the drafters of
the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”) have proposed a statutory remedy
in section 2-804(h)(2). The UPC provision bypasses the constructive
trust’s procedural safeguards and simply makes the ex-spouse beneficiary personally liable to the person who would have taken absent preemption of the revocation-on-divorce statute.13 Although these
remedies differ in approach, the theory underlying their application has
been the same: ERISA is only concerned with efficient, uniform plan
administration—which is preserved—and not with who ultimately enjoys the benefits—which state law is free to control.14
This paper questions whether states can do indirectly what federal
preemption prevents them from doing directly. A review of federal circuit court decisions reflects a split on whether ERISA forecloses the
constructive trust remedy. Most of these decisions suggest that ERISA’s interests end upon distribution, leaving the state free to redistribute the benefits to another person.15 A significant minority believes
that this is an impermissible end-run around federal law, contending
that states may not do indirectly what preemption prevents them from
doing directly.16 The statutory solution, on the other hand, has yet to be
tested.
Based on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the intersection of
federal preemption and state probate law, it is entirely possible that one
or both of these solutions will be found unacceptable intrusions on fed9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Gary, supra note 8, at 84.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 cmt.
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001).
E.g., Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 10 F.3d 700, 716 (10th Cir. 1993).
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2).
Id. § 2-804 cmt.
E.g., Guidry, 10 F.3d at 716.
E.g., United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681, 684 (4th Cir. 1995).
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eral law.17 This paper examines the possibility of such a result, suggesting that the policies underlying ERISA go beyond uniform
administration—specifically, that uniform administration is a mechanism for achieving the substantive purpose of protecting streams of retirement income for two classes of persons: participants and
beneficiaries. State laws that divert those income streams from persons
entitled to them under ERISA impermissibly “relate to” the federal
statute and are thus subject to preemption.
Part I introduces the preemption problem by examining the federal
and state laws that form the foundation of the present conflict and then
revisits their previous collision in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff. Part II presents
two important efforts to avoid the preemption implications of Egelhoff:
constructive trusts and the UPC provision making ex-spouse beneficiaries personally liable upon receipt of plan proceeds. Part III.A examines whether the UPC provision is likely to survive ERISA preemption
in light of Supreme Court jurisprudence, related federal legislation on
retirement benefits, and the practical implications of the law. Part III.B
considers the feasibility of constructive trusts through an examination of
case law and the overall fit of the remedy.
I. BACKGROUND
A. ERISA
In 1974, in light of the growing prominence and importance of employee benefit plans, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act to uniformly regulate employee benefit plans “in the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries.”18 In order to ensure
that these plans were protected in a uniform way across jurisdictions,
Congress included an express preemption provision, which declares that
ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” covered by ERISA.19
The Supreme Court has since interpreted the statute’s “relate to” language to encompass any state law that “has a connection with or reference to” an ERISA plan.20
Whether a law “references” ERISA will often be readily apparent,
as it must either specifically refer to or operate exclusively on ERISAplans.21 For example, in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service,
17 See generally Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001); Boggs
v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 854 (1997); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 669 (1962).
18 ERISA, supra note 1, § 1001(a).
19 Id. § 1144(a).
20 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
21 District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130-31 (1992).
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Inc., the Supreme Court reviewed a Georgia statute that purported to
bar garnishment of “[f]unds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee benefit plan or program subject to the provisions of the federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.”22 The Court
struck down the provision for expressly referring to ERISA and acting
solely upon ERISA-qualified plans, even to the extent that it was consistent with the federal statute.23
On the other hand, determining whether a law has “a connection
with” ERISA calls for a more nuanced analysis, requiring courts to consider (a) “the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of
the state law that Congress understood would survive” and (b) “the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.”24 The leading example of preemption in this context is Egelhoff, discussed in greater
detail in Part I.C.25 First, let us consider the type of statute under review in Egelhoff, as that statute reflects the state-law policy at the heart
of this paper.
B. Revocation-On-Divorce Statutes
Egelhoff involved a conflict between ERISA and a state revocation-on-divorce statute.26 Revocation-on-divorce statutes stipulate that
a provision in a will, and in some jurisdictions a nonprobate device,
transferring property to a spouse at death is automatically revoked upon
divorce—whereby the named recipient is considered predeceased.27
The statute “in effect constructively notifies the divorcing spouse that
his or her will is to be revoked by operation of law on the date the
marriage is terminated.”28 If the testator or principal fails to make subsequent changes to the will or nonprobate device, the property previously destined for the spouse will instead fall into the will’s residuary
clause, vest in a contingent beneficiary, or be distributed to the decedent’s intestate heirs, as the case may be.29
States deem this result desirable as a matter of public policy because it is more likely to effectuate the decedent’s intent—a guiding
principal for the modern interpretation of testamentary and non-testa22

Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 828 n.12 (1988).
Id. at 829-30.
24 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S.
316, 325 (1997) (citation omitted).
25 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
26 Id. at 143.
27 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 551 (2012).
28 Id.
29 Id.
23
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mentary transfers at death.30 Yet this public policy is ultimately a creature of the state law and although federal courts are generally
deferential to state probate and family law, that deference must invariably yield in the face of conflicting policies emanating from federal statutes. Such a conflict was the precise issue presented in Egelhoff.
C. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff
In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, the Supreme Court considered whether a Washington state revocation-on-divorce statute related
to ERISA in an impermissible way.31 The state statute revoked the designation of a spouse as beneficiary of any nonprobate asset automatically upon divorce. In the case, a plan participant, David Egelhoff, died
having failed to change the beneficiary designation on his employersponsored retirement plan after divorcing his wife Donna. After
David’s death, the administrator paid the proceeds to Donna in accordance with the plan documents. David’s children from a previous marriage, who were also his intestate heirs, sued Donna under the state
revocation statute to recover the plan proceeds.32
The Court held that such a redirection of the beneficial interest directly conflicted with ERISA’s instructions that the plan be administered according to the plan documents. This conflict implicated both
elements of the Court’s “connection with” inquiry: (1) ERISA’s objectives and (2) the state law’s effect on the ERISA-plan.33 With respect to
the first element, the Court noted that one objective of ERISA is administrative efficiency—an objective which would be hampered if administrators were forced to “master the relevant law of 50 states” in
order to distribute benefits to the correct person.34 As to the second
element, the state law’s effect on ERISA was essentially to abrogate its
express dictate by directing the administrator to pay a beneficiary determined by state rather than federal law.35
30 See generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the
Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1132 (1984) (“Modern practice supplies only
one theory that can reconcile [the law of] wills and will substitutes in a workable and
honest manner: the rule of the transferor’s intent.”).
31 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
32 Id. at 144. It should be noted that in Egelhoff, the defendant was not the plan
administrator, but the ex-spouse, who had actually received the plan benefits. The Court,
however, looked past the actual parties at issue to the potential impact that its ruling
would have on plan administrators in making distributions to beneficiaries in the future.
See id. at 141, 147-50.
33 Id. at 147-52.
34 Id. at 149-50.
35 Id. at 147.
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The persisting effect of Egelhoff is that revocation-on-divorce statutes requiring ERISA-plan administrators to pay someone other the
named beneficiary are expressly preempted by ERISA.36 Yet because
Egelhoff focused on the state law’s effect on plan administrators, rather
than beneficiaries, uncertainty has lingered as to the scope of ERISA
preemption. Some courts, in extending preemption to constructive trust
actions against distributed benefits, have held that Egelhoff mandates
preemption where the cause of action is based on a state-law property
right that conflicts with a beneficiary’s federally created property
right—regardless of whether the remedy is sought pre- or post-distribution.37 Conversely, a number of other courts, commentators, and legislatures have suggested that ERISA’s interest ends at distribution and
have crafted solutions aimed at circumventing Egelhoff’s impact.38 Part
II explores two of these solutions.
II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Constructive Trust
The overriding objection to Egelhoff has been that it subverts the
intent of the decedent, while unjustly enriching the beneficiary—his or
her ex-spouse.39 Specifically, people generally do not wish to provide
post-mortem benefits to a former spouse.40 The unjust enrichment
arises from the assumption that the ex-spouse received his or her fair
share in the divorce settlement, but receives a windfall as a result of the
decedent’s stale beneficiary designation.41 Some courts have responded
to this injustice by imposing a constructive trust on the benefits.42
A constructive trust is a “device used by equity to compel one who
unfairly holds a property interest to convey it to another to whom it
justly belongs.”43 A classic example of the circumstances meriting the
constructive trust is Estate of Lakatosh.44 There, one Roger Jacobs befriended an elderly Rose Lakatosh, exploited her weakened intellect,
36

See, e.g., Hattem v. Schwarzenegger, 449 F.3d 423, 430 (2d Cir. 2006).
Barnett v. Barnett, 67 S.W.3d 107, 112-13 (Tex. 2001); id. at 127 (Enoch, J.,
concurring).
38 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 2-804(h)(2) (2012); Hoult v. Hoult, 373
F.3d 47, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2004); Sarabeth A. Rayho, Note, Divorcees Turn in Their Graves
as Ex-Spouses Cash in: Codified Constructive Trusts Ensure an Equitable Result Regarding ERISA-Governed Employee Benefit Plans, 106 MICH. L. REV. 373, 396 (2007).
39 See Rayho, supra note 38, at 383.
40 Langbein, supra note 30, at 1135.
41 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 159 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
42 E.g., Hoult, 373 F.3d at 54-55.
43 CARYL A. YZENBAARD ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471 (2011).
44 Estate of Lakatosh, 656 A.2d 1378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
37
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and persuaded her to appoint him as attorney-in-fact. Roger then used
his position to misappropriate $128,565 of her money for his own purposes, while leaving her to live in squalor. The court impressed Roger’s
ill-gotten gains with a constructive trust and ordered him to deliver them
to Rose’s estate.45
In the wake of Egelhoff, a number of courts have considered
whether constructive trusts might be an acceptable tool for diverting
ERISA-plan proceeds from divorced-spouse beneficiaries to persons
whom the decedent is presumed to have preferred to receive the benefit.46 In order for the constructive trust to be imposed, the plaintiff must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the beneficiary’s continued
possession of the distributed benefits is unjust.47 As in Lakatosh, if the
injustice is so established, the beneficiary must then deliver the proceeds
to the rightful owner.
The Supreme Court has only discussed the feasibility of constructive trusts on ERISA benefits once, in the pre-Egelhoff case of Guidry
v. Sheet Metal Works National Pension Fund.48 In that case, Guidry, the
CEO of a labor union, brought an action against his pension fund to
recover retirement benefits. The pension fund had refused distribution
due to Guidry’s criminal conviction for embezzling union funds. The
district court imposed a constructive trust in favor of the union, but the
Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that a constructive trust may
not be imposed on plan benefits prior to distribution, because doing so
would interfere with ERISA’s mandate that “benefits provided under
the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”49
However, a number of courts continue to apply constructive trusts
to distributed proceeds, following the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Guidry
on remand.50 The Tenth Circuit noted that since ERISA only purports
to protect payments payable to the beneficiary, ERISA is not concerned
with the fate of benefits once paid.51 The court buttressed its position
by looking to Treasury Regulations promulgated under ERISA, which
define “alienation” in terms of rights or interests acquired from a beneficiary that are “enforceable against the plan.”52 The court held that
45

Id.
Compare Pardee v. Estate of Pardee, 112 P.3d 308, 314-16 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004)
(impressing a constructive trust on distributed benefits), with Staelens ex rel. Estate of
Staelens v. Staelens, 677 F.Supp.2d 499, 508 (D. Mass. 2010) (disagreeing with the Pardee
court’s claim that ERISA is not concerned with the fate of distributed benefits).
47 YZENBAARD, supra note 43, §§ 472, 475.2.
48 Guidry v. Sheet Metal Works Nat’l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
49 Id. at 367 n.1 (quoting ERISA § 1056(d)(1) (1982)).
50 Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 10 F.3d 700, 716 (10th Cir. 1993).
51 Id. at 712.
52 Id. at 708 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-(13)(c)(1)(ii) (1992)).
46

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2304.txt

Fall/Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 9

20-JAN-14

ERISA PREEMPTION

13:49

253

because post-distribution constructive trusts are enforced against the
beneficiary rather than the plan, they are not preempted by ERISA.53
B. UPC Section 2-804(h)(2)
The UPC provided another response, an “anti-Egelhoff provision,”54 which some commentators have suggested essentially codifies
the constructive trust remedy.55 It reads,
If [the revocation-on-divorce rules provided in] this section
[are] preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an
item of property, or any other benefit covered by this section, a
former spouse, relative of the former spouse, or any other person who, not for value, received a payment, item of property,
or any other benefit to which that person is not entitled under
this section is obligated to return that payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the
payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the
person who would have been entitled to it were this section or
part of this section not preempted.56
The UPC’s drafters justify the statute’s requirements by noting that
This provision respects ERISA’s concern that federal law govern the administration of the plan, while still preventing unjust
enrichment that would result if an unintended beneficiary were
to receive the pension benefits. Federal law has no interest in
working a broader disruption of state probate and nonprobate
transfer law than is required in the interest of smooth administration of pension and employee benefit plans.57
This provision accepts Egelhoff’s mandate that plan administrators
must distribute plan benefits to the beneficiary named in the plan documents. However, according to the provision’s drafters, ERISA’s interest terminates on distribution, leaving the states free to direct benefits to
other persons.58 The UPC thus suggests that states require the exspouse to deliver received benefits to the person who would have taken
had the revocation-on-divorce statute not been preempted. If the beneficiary fails to comply, he or she becomes personally liable to the rightful
53

Id. at 710.
Kent D. Schenkel, Planning and Drafting Basics Under the New Massachusetts
Uniform Probate Code, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 535, 555 (2011).
55 Rayho, supra note 38, at 393.
56 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2) (2010).
57 Id. § 2-804 cmt.
58 See id.
54
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owner under state law.59 The provision simply attempts to accomplish
indirectly what federal preemption prevents the state from doing directly: revoking beneficiary status upon divorce. The next section asks
whether this approach will work.
III. THE FEASIBILITY

OF

CIRCUMVENTING ERISA PREEMPTION

A. Can UPC Section 2-804 Do Indirectly What States Cannot Do
Directly?
1. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Retirement Benefits
Preemption
Although UPC section 2-804(h)(2) and constructive trusts are creative solutions to the potential inequities caused by the Egelhoff decision,
it is not entirely clear that they will work. These provisions essentially
perform an end-run around Egelhoff, while purporting to satisfy ERISA’s underlying objectives.60 The theory is that the federal government’s interest in ERISA is confined to the orderly and efficient
administration of benefits plans—and once the benefits are paid, that
interest is extinguished.61 The validity of these remedies, therefore,
turns on whether Congress was concerned not only with the ensuring
receipt of retirement benefits, but also with ensuring that the benefits
were available for the recipient to use in retirement.
As previously noted, the key case addressing the collision of ERISA and revocation-on-divorce statutes was Egelhoff, which left open
the question of whether distributed benefits are fair game.62 The Supreme Court has touched on the sanctity of distributed benefits in other
contexts, and the Court’s reasoning in Free v. Bland is particularly instructive.63 There, a husband and wife were co-owners of U.S. Treasury
Bonds. The applicable Treasury Regulations provided that upon the
death of one owner, the surviving owner “will be recognized as the sole
and absolute owner of the bond” and that “[n]o judicial determination
. . . would . . . defeat . . . the rights of survivorship conferred by these
regulations.”64 Mrs. Free predeceased her husband, bequeathing to her
son from a previous marriage the majority of her estate. The son
claimed a one-half interest in the bonds, pursuant to the will and Texas
law giving spouses an undivided one-half interest in all community property. The trial court resolved the conflict between federal and state law
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id.
Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010).
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 cmt.
See generally Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
Id. at 667 (quoting 31 C.F.R. § 315.20, 315.61).
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essentially by imposing a constructive trust: the court awarded “full title” to Mr. Free, but required him to pay over half of the bonds’ value to
Mrs. Free’s son.65
Before the Supreme Court, the son argued that the state law was
not preempted by the Treasury Regulation because the latter’s fundamental purpose was to create a convenient payment system, rather than
to determine who ultimately enjoyed the benefit.66 Indeed, the Court
recognized that the Treasury created the survivorship provision in order
to bypass the probate process. Yet that purpose was merely a sub-part
of a scheme aimed at facilitating the management of the national debt
by making savings bonds more attractive to savers and investors.67 In
holding that the state law impermissibly impinged on the Treasury Regulation, the Court made the following observation:
Viewed realistically, the State has rendered the award of title
meaningless. . . . If the State can frustrate the parties’ attempt
to use the bonds’ survivorship provision through the simple expedient of requiring the survivor to reimburse the estate of the
deceased co-owner as a matter of law, the State has interfered
directly with a legitimate exercise of the power of the Federal
Government . . . .68
This reasoning may apply with equal force in the current dispute
over revocation-on-divorce statutes.69 The drafters of the UPC suggest
that the Federal Government is not interested in who ultimately receives the benefits, as long as state law does not interfere with the administrator’s duty to distribute those benefits to the beneficiary named
in the plan.70 Yet like the statute in Free, ERISA’s concern with administrative efficiency must be considered in the context of broader policy
decisions underlying ERISA. ERISA was enacted to safeguard the interests of participants and beneficiaries—which was deemed best accomplished through efficient administration and uniform application.71
Free’s applicability to ERISA is evidenced by the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Boggs v. Boggs.72 There, the Court held that ERISA preempted a state law that allowed a participant’s spouse, Dorothy Boggs,
to transfer her interest in undistributed pension plan benefits by testamentary instrument. Dorothy died, predeceasing her husband and leav65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 669.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 669.
Id. (emphasis added).
Compare id., with UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2) (2010).
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 cmt.
See ERISA, supra note 1, § 1001(a).
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
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ing her estate to her children. Louisiana community property law had
given Dorothy a one-half interest in her husband Isaac’s employer-sponsored retirement plan. After Dorothy’s death, Isaac married Sandra
who became the new beneficiary of Isaac’s retirement plan. After
Isaac’s death, Sandra received annuity payments from Isaac’s plan, but
the children moved quickly to claim their rightful share under their
mother’s will—seeking to recoup both paid and unpaid plan benefits.73
First, the Court rejected the children’s claim for benefits payable to
Sandra, because the state law on which their claim was based purported
to act directly against the plan.74 The children’s second argument was
that because the remainder of the claim only concerned the fate of benefits already distributed, the law did not implicate ERISA’s concern
with efficient administration of benefit plans.75 The Court, relying on
Free, rejected this argument as well, stressing that the critical inquiry
was the diversion of retirement benefits—regardless of whether the interest in the pension plan is enforced against the plan or the recipient of
the benefit.76 Either way, the claim was based on a theory that their
interest originated in undistributed pension plan benefits, which the
Court informed them was impossible given that “the axis around which
ERISA’s protections revolve is the concept of participant and beneficiary. When Congress has chosen to depart from this framework, it has
done so in a careful and limited manner.”77
Another argument advanced in favor of anti-Egelhoff provisions
draws on Supreme Court language for the proposition that the Court
has “nothing to say” about generally applicable laws that “do not make
‘reference to’ ERISA plans, ‘notwithstanding their incidental effect on
ERISA plans.’”78 Thus, it is suggested that because provisions like
UPC section 2-804(h)(2) apply when any federal law—not just ERISA—preempts the state law, they are generally applicable.79 Moreover, since UPC section 2-804(h)(2) does not affect the administration of
benefits, its effect on ERISA is incidental.80 But if we reassemble what
the Supreme Court actually said about ERISA preemption in Egelhoff
this point loses some of its force: “Unlike generally applicable laws regulating ‘areas where ERISA has nothing to say,’ . . . which we have
upheld notwithstanding their incidental effect on ERISA plans . . . this
73

Id. at 836-37.
Id. at 844.
75 Id. at 845.
76 Id. at 853.
77 Id. at 854.
78 Rayho, supra note 38, at 394 (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532
U.S. 141, 147-48 (2001)).
79 Id. at 393-94.
80 Id.
74
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statute governs payment of benefits, a central matter of plan administration.”81 Therefore, according to the Court, the critical inquiry in the
preemption analysis is whether a generally applicable state law intrudes
into an area where ERISA has something to say.
The fact that ERISA bestows named plan beneficiaries with a federal property right in retirement benefits indicates that ERISA has
something to say about who should enjoy those benefits. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly stressed that “legislation of this type should be
liberally construed . . . to protect funds granted by the Congress for the
maintenance and support of the beneficiaries thereof.”82 In addition,
Boggs and Free strongly suggest that the federal government’s interest
in ERISA plans goes beyond their orderly administration and reaches
the question of whose retirement benefits the law is intended to protect.83 The Court in Boggs affirmed that ERISA is intended to protect
participants and beneficiaries unless Congress expresses otherwise.84
Until Congress does provide otherwise, Boggs seems to stand for the
proposition that ERISA can preempt state law attempts to control postdistribution benefits.85
When examined in its entirety, the theory underlying UPC section
2-804 is that upon divorce, the ex-spouse beneficiary’s interest is extinguished—which in turn creates an expectancy in someone determined
by state law.86 Yet Boggs rejected the notion that anyone other than
participant or named beneficiary can develop a legitimate expectancy in
plan funds.87 By making a named beneficiary personally liable for receiving a federal entitlement, not only does 2-804(h)(2) reach into an
area where ERISA has something to say, it has substantially more than
“incidental” effect on ERISA plans by controlling the ultimate destination of benefits.
2. Congressional Intent in ERISA Preemption
ERISA is more than a convenient regulatory structure for timely
payments; as Boggs suggests, it is a mechanism for protecting anticipated retirement benefits so that retirees have a steady stream of in81 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147-48 (emphasis added ) (citations omitted) (quoting Cal.
Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 330
(1997)).
82 Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159, 162 (1962) (citations omitted); see
also Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245, 250 (1937); Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354
(1933).
83 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 853 (1997); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 669 (1962).
84 Boggs, 520 U.S. at 845-46.
85 Id. at 854.
86 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)(2) (2010).
87 Boggs, 520 U.S. at 834-35.

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2304.txt

258

unknown

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

Seq: 14

20-JAN-14

13:49

[Vol. 38:245

come.88 This is one reason why ERISA-plan benefits are inalienable.89
The legislative history to the anti-alienation clause illustrates that the
provision’s purpose was “to . . . ensure that the employee’s accrued benefits are actually available for retirement purposes.”90 Furthermore, the
fact that ERISA requires spouses to be named as beneficiaries represents a policy judgment on the part of Congress that spouses have a
legitimate expectation of enjoying those benefits in retirement as well.91
Divorce, in and of itself, does not extinguish that right to benefits—certain steps must be taken by the beneficiary or plan participant to effect a
change.92
Perhaps Congress intended to carefully prescribe the circumstances
where an ex-spouse can be deprived of his or her former spouse’s retirement benefits. In fact, it has expressed this intention in other contexts.
For instance, a divorced spouse of a worker has rights to social security
benefits if the marriage lasted ten years or longer.93 This benefit comports with the prevailing view that marriage should be viewed as a partnership, whereby each spouse is entitled to share as a partner in any
economic benefits received by the partnership during the marriage.94 In
ERISA too, Congress has provided protections for an ex-spouse’s interest in his or her former spouse’s retirement plan by requiring that (1)
any current spouse must be named as beneficiary on an ERISA-qualified plan; (2) the plan administrator must pay the named beneficiary if
the participant has predeceased; and (3) that although the participant
can change the beneficiary designation after divorce, this right is tempered by the ex-spouse’s ability to receive the benefits through a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”).95
88 Id. at 852 (noting that ERISA functions to protect pension benefits, “which are
intended to provide a stream of income to participants and their beneficiaries.”).
89 Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990)
(holding that ERISA’s anti-alienation provision reflected a “congressional policy choice,
a decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners . . . even if that decision prevents others from securing relief for the wrongs done them.”).
90 H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 4734 (1974).
91 ERISA, supra note 1, § 1055(a)(2).
92 See Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 303-04
(2009) (noting the plan documents rule requires the administrator to pay the ex-spouse
unless the participant changes the designation or the beneficiary disclaims her interest in
accordance with plan rules).
93 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 404.331 (2011).
94 See Shari Motro, Labor, Luck, and Love: Reconsidering the Sanctity of Separate
Property, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1623, 1631-33 (2008).
95 See ERISA, supra note 1, § 1056(d)(3)(A). Of course, the QDRO remedy is not
available for social security benefits, which makes the spousal-protection justification
more compelling in that context. The broader point is that Congress has generally not
taken the position that divorce operates to nullify spousal support rights.
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Thus Congress has deliberately provided mechanisms for allowing
an ex-spouse to be protected during advanced years, either by an unchanged beneficiary designation or by a QDRO. In light of the ancillary
protection of social security benefits, it is possible to discern a congressional policy in ERISA beyond mere uniform plan administration, but
of protecting income streams to retirees that develop a legitimate expectancy in that income—which includes not only participants and their
spouses, but also their ex-spouses.
On the other hand, the Social Security Act contains an anti-assignment provision specifically providing that “none of the moneys paid . . .
shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other
legal process.”96 Similarly, the Veterans Benefits Act also explicitly exempts paid proceeds from garnishment.97 In contrast, ERISA is ambiguous as to the fate of paid benefits.98 Therefore, because Congress
clearly knows how to craft statutory language distinguishing between
distributed and undistributed funds, its failure to include express language in ERISA protecting paid benefits suggests that ERISA was perhaps not meant to offer such protection. Furthermore, if Congress were
overly concerned with the rights of ex-spouse beneficiaries, its decision
to allow plan participants to prevent an ex-spouse from receiving benefits through a simple change on the beneficiary designation form is certainly curious.
More likely, Congress wanted a clear expression of intent from the
plan participant. Upon divorce, ERISA returns to the plan participant
the right to direct benefits to whomever he or she pleases. The UPC
provision effectively curtails this right. Not only is the participant foreclosed from directing benefits to his ex-spouse, but perhaps more importantly, the participant may not provide for any relative of that exspouse.99 Suppose, for instance, that when “H” and “W” get married,
W already has a child, “C,” from another relationship. H names W as
primary beneficiary on his employer-sponsored retirement plan, and
names C as contingent beneficiary. H and W are married for ten years,
in which time, H forms a close bond with C. H and W divorce, but H
maintains a relationship with C and genuinely wants to provide for C
after his death. The facial problem is that upon H’s death, the UPC will
not allow even C to keep the plan proceeds that H intended for him to
96

42 U.S.C. § 407(a).
38 U.S.C. § 5301 (“[S]uch payments made to, or on account of, a beneficiary shall
be exempt from . . . seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either
before or after receipt by the beneficiary.”).
98 ERISA, supra note 1, § 1056(d)(1) (“Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”).
99 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2) (2010).
97
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receive.100 Even more troubling, however, is the fact that the UPC
doesn’t even allow C to admit evidence of H’s intent.101
Although congressional intent in ERISA may be ambiguous as to
paid benefits, ERISA unambiguously grants specific rights to certain
classes of persons. While statutes like UPC section 2-804(h)(2) do aim
to “protect ERISA’s objectives by respecting the interests of plan participants,” it should not be forgotten that participants had a far simpler
method for advancing this interest themselves: changing the beneficiary
designation.102 The UPC presumes that the participant simply forgot or
procrastinated, but unlike a proceeding to establish a constructive trust,
provides no mechanism for demonstrating this intent. This approach
can lead to reasonably anticipatable anomalies such as the hypothetical
above, where the UPC thwarts rather than furthers the participant’s
intent.
The potential for injustice is compounded by the fact that the
named beneficiary—who is required to receive the benefit under federal
law—is then whipsawed by state law and forced to disgorge the benefit,
even though the beneficiary would have been entitled to damages had
the administrator directly paid the person who ultimately received it.103
This point can also be illustrated by a hypothetical. Suppose “H” and
“W” get married and H names W as beneficiary on his ERISA-governed life insurance plan. They then get divorced, and H does not
change the beneficiary designation. H dies and the plan administrator,
instead of distributing the proceeds to W, delivers the proceeds to the
H’s estate. Under ERISA, W has the right to obtain a judgment against
the plan administrator for mismanagement of the plan funds and recover damages.104
Suppose instead, however, that the plan administrator does pay W,
who receives a check for $10,000. She contacts the plan administrator,
and asks whether the money belongs to her. The plan administrator
confirms that indeed federal law requires him to pay her. Assured that
it is hers, she spends it. Next comes H’s estate, claiming that she had no
right to the money under state law and she must deliver it over to the
estate. Now, because of federal preemption, she has no action against
the plan administrator for wrongfully telling her that the money was
hers, as the administrator can’t be held liable under state law for following a federal law. Yet perversely, W also has no defense against the
estate because state law says that she is personally liable under state law
100
101
102
103
104

Id.
Id.
See Rayho, supra note 38, at 395.
ERISA, supra note 1, §§ 1109(a), 1132(a)(1).
Id.
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for receiving money that she had a federal right to receive. W, the beneficiary, would have been better off had the administrator breached his
or her fiduciary duty by paying the estate directly. Surely this cannot be
the result that Congress intended.
3. Why the UPC Provision Is Not a “Codified Constructive
Trust”
Some commentators have suggested that 2-804(h)(2) essentially
codifies the equitable remedy of constructive trusts.105 One problem
with this justification—which will be discussed in Part III.B—is that it
glosses over the uncertainty as to whether the constructive trust remedy
will survive ERISA preemption in its own right. Secondly, although it
may achieve the same result, codifying the principle fundamentally alters the nature of the remedy by imposing an irrebuttable presumption
that the ex-spouse was unjustly enriched. Conversely, when the constructive trust remedy is applied, the unjust enrichment must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence by the party seeking the remedy. If
that burden is met, the recipient must disgorge the benefit and deliver it
to its rightful owner.106
The use of constructive trusts is based on a theory of unjust enrichment: the reaping of benefits from wrongdoing is determined to be
against public policy. In the context of estate planning, the remedy is
most commonly applied where the wrongdoing consists of fraud, undue
influence, or homicide.107 In some instances, codifying the rule poses
little risk of upsetting the equitable principles that underlie it. Slayer
statutes, for example, forbid a person from inheriting from the person
they were convicted of slaying.108 Thus if a person has already been
convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter, it is unlikely that further judicial review will shed light on the equities of the probate.
Some commentators have argued that if UPC section 2-804(h)(2)
were uniformly adopted, it would avoid ERISA preemption for the
same reasons that the Egelhoff Court suggested slayer statutes might
avoid ERISA.109 In Egelhoff, the Court suggested that slayer statutes
105

See, e.g., Rayho, supra note 38, at 390-92.
Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2) (2010) (stating that a former
spouse, or any person not entitled to a benefit, is obligated to return the benefit or be
liable for the amount of the benefit), with YZENBAARD, supra note 43, § 472 (explaining
possible conditions precedent that may be required of the plaintiff before return of the
benefit or property).
107 See YZENBAARD, supra note 43, §§ 473-78.
108 Id. § 478.
109 Katherine A. McAllister, Note, A Distinction Without a Difference? ERISA Preemption and the Untenable Differential Treatment of Revocation-On-Divorce and Slayer
Statutes, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1481, 1494-95 (2011).
106
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were distinguishable from the revocation-on-divorce statute at issue insofar as the former may not interfere with ERISA “because the statutes
are more or less uniform nationwide.”110 Assuming that this is true, it
would tend to address ERISA’s concerns with administrative efficiency,
as distributions would remain uniform and plan administrators would
not have to “master the relevant law of 50 states.”111 Additionally, the
Court has held elsewhere that it will not sanction attempts by wrongdoers to use federal preemption as a shield from state law—and slayer
statutes remain consistent with that principle.112
Yet it is unclear that the theory underlying slayer statutes can be
easily transmuted to revocation-on-divorce provisions such as UPC section 2-804(h)(2). First, unlike slayer rules, 2-804(h)(2) does not have a
“long historical pedigree predating ERISA.”113 Second, unlike a slayer,
an ex-spouse is not profiting from a misdeed—his or her own, or anyone
else’s for that matter. Surely, he or she is benefiting from a favorable
law, but that is not necessarily unjust. Despite the UPC’s irrebuttable
presumption that distributions to a former spouse (and that former
spouse’s relatives) thwart a plan participant’s intent, it should be kept in
mind that the former spouse’s name has been voluntarily left in the plan
documents as the beneficiary.114 Concededly, more often than not, the
continued presence of the former spouse’s name on the form indicates
that the form became stale upon dissolution of the marriage, and therefore no longer carries out the decedent’s intent.115 Theoretically an injustice arises because the participant would not have intended for his exspouse to receive the benefits of his plan and the spouse has already
received everything he or she is entitled to in the divorce settlement.116
Yet there may be situations where allowing an ex-spouse—or a
child of an ex-spouse—to receive benefits does no injustice whatsoever,
such as amicable divorces or where the participant sought to provide for
the ex-spouse’s child.117 Removing the issue from judicial review not
only relieves the objectors of their burden of proving injustice by clear
and convincing evidence under traditional constructive trust doctrine; it
110 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001); see McAllister,
supra note 109.
111 See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 149-150.
112 See, e.g., Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 307 (1964) (recognizing a fraud exception to the plan documents rule in the Treasury bonds context).
113 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152.
114 But see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 cmt. (2010) (unjust enrichment justifies
liability).
115 Gary, supra note 8, at 83-84.
116 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 159 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
117 See Luff v. Luff, 359 F.2d 235, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
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forecloses the opportunity of named beneficiaries to prove that the participant intended to leave them on the form. Of course, revocation statutes applying to wills operate identically and seek to further the same
policy.118 The difference is that qualified retirement plans are governed
by a federal statute giving the named beneficiary a right to the funds,
suggesting that Congress sought to err in favor of the spouse.119 While
constructive trusts retain the presumption in favor of the spouse, the
UPC statute turns the presumption against the spouse and makes it irrebuttable—ostensibly undermining federal law.
4. Reliance on UPC Section 2-804(h)(2)
The case for preemption is strengthened upon examination of the
practical effects of 2-804(h)(2) on ERISA plans. As in Free, the statute
“render[s] the award of title meaningless,” by simply requiring the recipient of benefits to reimburse a person to be determined by state law.120
This too may “interfere directly with a legitimate exercise of power by
the Federal Government,” by subverting the statute’s effect of protecting retirement income for those with a federally created interest in it.121
Given that it is unclear whether federal courts will honor 2-804(h)(2),
states should be cautious in deciding whether to adopt it.122
Practitioners should also be cautious before relying on the UPC
provision even when it has been adopted in their jurisdiction. For instance, in Staelens ex rel. Estate of Staelens v. Staelens, the estate of a
plan participant was precluded from recovering plan proceeds from the
ex-spouse beneficiary.123 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts cited language from Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for
DuPont Savings and Investment Plan, indicating that ERISA was interested in “ensur[ing] that beneficiaries get what’s coming quickly”124 and
then commented that “[i]t is difficult to believe that these interests
would simply fall by the wayside once funds had been distributed.”125
Nonetheless, Massachusetts has since adopted 2-804(h)(2) into its general laws.126 Although Staelens is not a death-knell for the application
of UPC section 2-804(h)(2) in Massachusetts, the co-existence of contra118

79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 550 (2012).
ERISA, supra note 1, § 1104(a)(1)(D) (directing the administrator to follow the
plan documents).
120 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 669 (1962).
121 Id.
122 Compare Staelens ex rel. Estate of Staelens v. Staelens, 677 F. Supp. 2d 499, 508
(D. Mass. 2010), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 2-804(h)(2) (2012).
123 Staelens, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 510-11.
124 Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 301 (2009).
125 Staelens, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
126 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 2-804(h)(2).
119
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vening federal and state law does obscure the rights of participants, beneficiaries, and would-be objectors.127
Ultimately, ERISA’s preemption provision “displace[s] all state
laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA’s substantive requirements,”128 and therein lies the
problem with UPC section 2-804(h)(2). While the law technically complies with ERISA’s requirements by letting the plan administrator pay
the named beneficiary, it nonetheless falls within ERISA’s sphere by
depriving that person of using those benefits in retirement where a fundamental underpinning of ERISA is protecting income streams for retirees.129 The drafters of the UPC have taken the understandable position
of creating provisions designed to carry out the probable intent of the
decedent.130 Yet clever state law drafting cannot cure flawed federal
legislation, and the Supreme Court has thus far declined to re-write ERISA to produce the “right” result.131 If Congress perceives that its laws
are producing the wrong results, it is in the best position to provide an
appropriate remedy.132
B. Can Constructive Trusts Reach Distributed ERISA Benefits?
1. Why Constructive Trusts Might Work
An alternative proposal for combating the Egelhoff problem has
been to apply the equitable remedy of constructive trusts. This approach is appealing, because unlike the UPC’s one-size-fits-all rule, the
constructive trust doctrine allows the court to consider all of the evidence on a case-by-case basis. The Supreme Court has discussed—and
approved—the imposition of constructive trusts on distributed ERISAplan benefits in at least one circumstance. In Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic
Medical Services, Inc., a fiduciary of an ERISA-qualified health plan
sought reimbursement of medical expenses paid to a beneficiary after
the beneficiary received tort-compensation for injuries from a third
party.133 The Court held that plan fiduciaries have the explicit right,
127 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 149 n.3 (2001) (noting when the
costs of delay and uncertainty are passed on to beneficiaries, it tends to thwart ERISA’s
objective of efficient plan administration).
128 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
129 See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 852 (1997).
130 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 cmt. (2010) (dubbing ex-spouses “unintended
beneficiaries.”).
131 See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376-77
(1990).
132 Id.
133 Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Serv. Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 359-60 (2006).
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under ERISA, to enforce the terms of a plan by obtaining post-distribution equitable relief—which included seeking a constructive trust.134
Sereboff did not turn on whether the trust was imposed pre- or
post-distribution, but on whether ERISA’s terms permitted the fiduciary to take this type of action.135 Thus it can be fairly inferred from
Sereboff that ERISA’s interest can extend beyond distribution, as the
law defines not only the type of relief that may be sought post-distribution, but also who may invoke the relief and for what reason.136 While
Sereboff involved a mistaken distribution, the case illustrates that Congress took care to prescribe the particular circumstances where postdistribution equitable relief is available. This suggests that the fate of
distributed benefits is not an area where ERISA has “nothing to say,”
and consequently, judicially grafting circumstances for equitable relief
onto the statute may therefore “relate to” ERISA in an impermissible
way.137
Additionally, the Court held in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates that
ERISA’s “carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides
‘strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize remedies that
it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.’”138 While Sereboff demonstrates that Congress has provided circumstances where post-distribution equitable relief may be available, such an opportunity was not
extended to expecting heirs seeking recovery from a decedent’s exspouse beneficiary. Therefore under Mertens, the failure to provide the
participant’s estate with a remedy against such ex-spouse beneficiaries
would seem to be “strong evidence” that Congress did not intend for
such a remedy to be available.139 On the other hand, the Court has
explicitly reserved judgment as to whether courts may independently
impress a post-distribution constructive trust in favor of persons not specifically identified by ERISA as having a federal entitlement to the
funds.140
In other contexts, the Court has placed significant weight on the
existence of express post-distribution protections in federal retirement
benefit statutes. In Wissner v. Wissner, for example, the Court considered whether a state community property law granting the decedent’s
134

Id. at 364.
Id. at 359, 369.
136 See id. at 364 (interpreting ERISA, supra note 1, § 1132(a)(3) to permit postdistribution remedies).
137 See id.
138 Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993) (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145 (1985)).
139 See id.
140 Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 299 n.10
(2009).
135
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widow a right to insurance proceeds could support an action to recover
such proceeds after they had been paid to the decedent’s parents, who
had been named as beneficiaries pursuant to the National Service Life
Insurance Act (“NSLIA”).141 The Court focused on to two characteristics of the NSLIA: (1) the Act’s anti-alienation provision expressly applied to paid proceeds; and (2) only the plan participant was empowered
to choose the beneficiary. The Court reasoned that it was clear that
“Congress ha[d] spoken with force and clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other. . . . Whether directed at the very money received from the Government or an
equivalent amount, [allowing recovery] nullifies the soldier’s choice and
frustrates the purpose of Congress.”142
The same reasoning was again applied in Ridgway v. Ridgway—
there in the context of the Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act of
1965 (SGLIA).143 In Ridgway, the decedent was obligated under a state
divorce decree to maintain insurance policies for the benefit of his three
children. However, upon remarriage he designated his new wife as beneficiary on his SGLIA plan. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine ordered that a constructive trust be imposed on life insurance proceeds in
favor of the children. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, again supporting its decision by pointing out that the SGLIA required that benefits be
paid to the beneficiary named in the plan documents and that the Act’s
anti-attachment provision expressly applied to paid proceeds.144 However, while an express provision protecting paid benefits seems sufficient to block a constructive trust, the Court has not held that such a
provision is required.
In determining whether to impose a constructive trust on plan distributions to ex-spouses, courts will generally examine whether “the exspouse received his or her fair share in the divorce and [whether] the
decedent likely did not intend for the ex-spouse to receive the ERISA
plan proceeds.”145 If so, the court has “discretion to impose an equitable constructive trust on the assets in favor of other claimants to the
proceeds.”146 Such “other claimants” might include the estate, secondary beneficiaries, legatees, or heirs. This arrangement would not affect
administration of the plan: the administrator would still distribute the
proceeds to the ex-spouse named as beneficiary, who would have legal
141
142
143
144
145
146

Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 656-58 (1950).
Id. at 658-59.
Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1981).
Id. at 60-62.
See Rayho, supra note 38, at 390.
Id.
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title to those proceeds.147 The ex-spouse would then be obligated to
deliver the funds to whomever the court deemed as having equitable
title.148
One suggestion for why this avoids preemption focuses on the language in ERISA declaring that the federal statute “shall supersede all
laws as they may or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”149
In a recent law review article that has been cited in both state and federal trial court decisions, Sarabeth Rayho argues that because constructive trusts are equitable remedies, rather than laws, the preemption
provision is not triggered.150 While intriguing, this distinction is unlikely
to stick in light of the fact that ERISA defines laws as “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of
law.”151 A constructive trust clearly fits within this definition, as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s holding in Guidry that ERISA preempted the use of constructive trust on undistributed plan benefits.152
Another argument has been proffered in a probing article by T.P.
Gallanis.153 Professor Gallanis suggests that the most likely solution to
the “mess” caused by Egelhoff would be the development of federal
common law based on constructive trust principles found in the UPC
and Restatement Third of Property.154 A federal common law solution
is necessary, explained Gallanis, because a state remedy is unlikely to
survive ERISA preemption:
Constructive trusts are creatures of state law, and the decisions
of the Supreme Court have made it clear that ERISA’s preemption provision trumps the application of contrary state law.
In Egelhoff and in the 1997 case of Boggs v. Boggs, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the possibility that state law
could be used to award the property to a person other than the
beneficiary required by ERISA. Thus, remedies arising from
state law, such as the constructive trust provisions of the UPC,
are ineffective against ERISA’s broad preemption.155
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id.
Id. at 391.
Id. n.114 (quoting ERISA, supra note 1, § 1144(a)).
Id.
ERISA, supra note 1, § 1144(c)(1).
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 372, 376-77

(1990).
153

T.P. Gallanis, ERISA and the Law of Succession, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 193

(2004).
154
155

Id. at 196.
Id. at 193.
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At the time, Gallanis’s suggestion of a federal common law solution was
plausible given that (1) the Supreme Court had expressly approved the
creation of federal common law under ERISA; and (2) ERISA’s preemption provision declares that the federal statute shall supersede any
state law, and is silent as to its effects on competing federal law.156
However, the Supreme Court’s subsequent holding in Kennedy
seems to have evaporated the distinction between state and federal
common law for preemption purposes. In Kennedy, the decedent
named his wife as beneficiary of his ERISA-governed employee benefits
plan.157 Subsequently, the two divorced, pursuant to which Mrs. Kennedy signed a waiver of her rights to her ex-husband’s benefit plans.
Mr. Kennedy later died having failed to change the beneficiary designation. Federal common law validated Mrs. Kennedy’s waiver of benefits,
but since the waiver didn’t meet ERISA’s requirements, the question
arose as to whether federal common law was preempted by ERISA’s
plan documents rule. The Court answered in the affirmative, holding
that “[w]hat goes for inconsistent state law goes for a federal common
law of waiver.”158
Thus the viability of constructive trusts as an end-run around Egelhoff is unlikely to turn on whether the trust is imposed under state or
federal common law. Importantly however, in a footnote, the Kennedy
Court explicitly left open the question “as to whether the Estate could
have brought an action in state or federal court against [Mrs. Kennedy]
to obtain the benefits after they were distributed.”159 This suggests that
regardless of whether a constructive trust is imposed under state or federal common law, the critical question that has yet to be answered by
the Court is whether ERISA was intended to protect paid benefits. Perhaps the Court is waiting for the issue to be sufficiently litigated in the
lower courts before rendering a decision. As the next section attempts
to illustrate, the growing fissure among the circuit courts on this issue
may soon force the Court to provide an answer.
2. A Court Divided: The Untenable Split in Circuit Authority
A narrow majority of circuit courts—encompassing the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits—have been receptive to the constructive trust remedy when applied to distributed plan benefits.160 As
noted above, the leading case is Guidry on remand in the Tenth Circuit,
which held that because ERISA’s anti-alienation provision expressly re156
157
158
159
160

ERISA, supra note 1, § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 289 (2009).
Id. at 303.
Id. at 299 n.10.
See infra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
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fers to benefits payable, rather than paid, ERISA’s preemptive force
dissolves upon distribution.161 States, therefore, are free to redirect
benefits from the beneficiaries to other persons.
Federal appellate case law on the ability of expecting heirs to obtain a post-distribution constructive trust remedy is limited, but a recent
case from the Third Circuit is directly on point. In Estate of Kensinger v.
URL Pharma, Inc., William Kensinger participated in a retirement plan
sponsored by his employer.162 As required, Kensinger designated his
wife Adele as beneficiary. Later, the two divorced and Adele waived
her interest in all retirement benefits in the divorce decree (which did
not qualify as a QDRO or valid plan waiver). William then died having
neglected to change the beneficiary designation on his plan documents.
William’s estate brought an action against Adele to recover the distributed benefits. The district court, relying on the Supreme Court’s holdings in Kennedy and Boggs, held that actions against distributed plan
benefits were preempted by ERISA because such actions would “directly undermine one of ERISA’s core objectives: providing certainty
regarding the final distribution of ERISA benefits.”163
The Third Circuit reversed.164 The court distinguished Boggs, noting that although the Court prohibited an action against distributed benefits, the Court’s holding was limited to situations where the theory of
the case hinged on a state-law interest in those benefits arising before
they were distributed. In Kensinger, the estate’s claim was confined to
its interest in the distributed proceeds.165 Additionally, the court emphasized that Kennedy explicitly left unsettled the fate of distributed
benefits.166 In light of this ambiguity, the court looked to other circuit
authority and observed that the majority of circuits have applied the
reasoning of Guidry on remand that ERISA’s interest in plan benefits
terminates on distribution. The Third Circuit, finding the Tenth Circuit’s logic persuasive, sided with the majority.167
As Kensinger noted, a majority of circuits have permitted actions
against distributed plan benefits. The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning was
adopted by the First Circuit in Hoult v. Hoult, which held that ERISA
did not bar creditors from accessing distributed plan proceeds.168 The
161

Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n,10 F.3d 700, 710-11, 716 (10th Cir.

1993).
162
163

Estate of Kensinger v. URL Pharma, Inc., 674 F.3d 131, 132-33 (3d Cir. 2012).
In re Estate of Kensinger, No. 09-6510, 2010 WL 4445752, at *4 (D. N.J. Nov. 1,

2010).
164
165
166
167
168

Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 139.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 135-38.
Hoult v. Hoult, 373 F.3d 47, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2004).
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Second Circuit followed suit in United States v. Jaffe, where a benefits
recipient was ordered to make restitution after defrauding a federally
insured bank.169 Jaffe argued that requiring him to repay the bank out
of distributed plan funds violated ERISA’s anti-alienation clause. The
Second Circuit disagreed, holding that ERISA only protects funds from
alienation while they are in the hands of the plan administrator.170
Lastly, in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cox, the Sixth Circuit held that although one of ERISA’s principal purposes is protecting retirement income streams, “once the benefit payments have been disbursed to a
beneficiary, creditors may encumber the proceeds.”171
While not dealing directly with the question of whether an estate
can bring an action to recover retirement benefits as the rightful beneficiary, the cases out of the First, Second, and Sixth Circuits give rise to a
reasonable inference that the courts would rule similarly should such a
case reach them. On the other hand, these cases could be also interpreted as affirming the status of the named beneficiary as the rightful
beneficiary. None of the cases question the right of the recipient to the
benefits; rather, the courts simply enforce creditors’ rights against those
recipients. Because the rights of creditors necessarily rest on the right of
the debtor to the property, these cases are implicitly recognizing the
beneficiary’s federally created property interest.172 Left open, therefore, is the question of who would have prevailed had there been competing claims between the estate of the plan participant and the
creditors of the beneficiary.
This distinction somewhat weakens the majority relied upon by
Kensinger. The Third Circuit’s opinion suffers from other flaws as well.
The first problem involves the court’s attempt to distinguish Boggs by
noting that the estate’s right to the plan funds was not based on a predistribution interest. This assertion is belied by the facts of the case.
The estate’s right to plan-proceeds was based on Kensinger’s ex-wife’s
waiver of benefits in the divorce decree. This occurred before the distribution occurred. Thus as far as state law is concerned, the ex-wife’s
right to retain funds terminated upon the waiver, making the estate the
de facto beneficiary in the absence of a change on the form.173 Therefore, Kensinger is actually quite similar to Boggs.174
169

United States v. Jaffe, 417 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id.
171 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cox, 447 F.3d 967, 974 (6th Cir. 2006).
172 See 7 C.J.S. Attachment § 65 (2004) (“In order to be subject to attachment . . . the
defendant must have some right or title to such property.”).
173 Estate of Kensinger v. URL Pharma, Inc., 674 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2012).
174 Compare id., with Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 854 (1997).
170
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Secondly, in supporting its position that ERISA’s interest ends at
distribution, the Third Circuit relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Jackson.175 The facts of Jackson are not important, because as the Kensinger court recognized, Jackson was partially overruled
by United States v. Novack.176 What the Third Circuit failed to mention
was that any remaining value in the Jackson opinion was completely
vitiated by Carmona v. Carmona.177 Previously, in a pre-Egelhoff decision, Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., the Ninth Circuit stated that ERISA “would not prohibit the imposition of a constructive trust on
insurance proceeds after their distribution to the beneficiary.”178 However, in Carmona, the court noted that Emard did not survive Egelhoff.179 Thus the court concluded that a constructive trust could not be
impressed on distributed pension proceeds, and “[a]ny alternative rule
would allow for an end-run around ERISA’s rules and Congress’s policy
objective of providing for certain beneficiaries, thereby greatly weakening, if not entirely abrogating, ERISA’s broad preemption provision.”180
The Fourth Circuit has also interpreted the Supreme Court’s Guidry decision to prohibit actions against distributed plan benefits.181 In
United States v. Smith, the court asserted that one “purpose of ERISA is
to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners” and where “funds are
paid pursuant to the terms of the plan as income during retirement
years, ERISA prohibits their alienation.”182 The court buttressed this
position by drawing from another Supreme Court case, Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo.183 Although that case was decided under the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA), the “RRA contains anti-alienation provisions substantially similar to those in ERISA.”184 Because Hisquierdo held that
even distributed proceeds were inalienable,185 the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the same rule should apply to distributed ERISA-plan bene175 United States v. Jackson, 229 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled in part by
United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
176 Novak, 476 F.3d at 1058.
177 Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2010).
178 Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled in part
by Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2006).
179 Carmona, 603 F.3d at 1062.
180 Id. at 1061.
181 United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681, 682-83 (4th Cir. 1995), superseded by statute,
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1230
(amended 2000).
182 Smith, 47 F.3d at 683.
183 Id.; See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), superseded by statute, 45
U.S.C. § 231m (amended 1983).
184 Smith, 47 F.3d at 683.
185 See id.
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fits, holding that “[t]he government should not be allowed to do
indirectly what it cannot do directly.”186
The Seventh Circuit also precludes courts from using constructive
trusts to circumvent ERISA preemption. In Melton v. Melton, the decedent’s ex-wife was named as beneficiary on his ERISA-governed life
insurance plan.187 The decedent’s daughter challenged the ex-wife’s
right to the proceeds and requested that the court impose a constructive
trust in the daughter’s favor. The Seventh Circuit declined the invitation, holding that ERISA determines who the rightful beneficiary is by
referring to the form designation and a constructive trust remedy that
redirected paid proceeds to a state-law designated person was preempted.188 Courts applying Melton have affirmed that ERISA protects
distributed proceeds: “A constructive trust would violate ERISA’s preemptive force even if it applied after the funds from the policy were
actually distributed.”189
The reasoning of the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits is persuasive if one believes that Congress went through the trouble of including
anti-alienation and preemption clauses in ERISA to ensure that fund
recipients could use their retirement benefits in retirement. This position, however, is far from certain; the Tenth and Third Circuits have
flatly rejected it, and the First, Second, and Sixth Circuits have at least
called it into question by broadly permitting creditor claims against distributed benefits. This fractious split in circuit authority suggests that
the issue is ripe for Supreme Court review. The following section suggests that the Court consider not only whether ERISA’s objectives
reach distributed benefits, but also whether constructive trusts redirecting benefits to expecting heirs serve the remedy’s equitable
principles.
3. Will a Constructive Trust “Do Equity?”
Although there is disagreement on the appropriateness of post-distribution constructive trusts, it should also not be forgotten that a constructive trust is an equitable remedy. The Supreme Court has warned
that “courts should be loath to announce equitable exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions that are unqualified by the statutory
text.”190 Moreover, commandeering the funds from one who has received them as a result of a federal entitlement and then—absent any
186

Id. at 684.
Melton v. Melton, 324 F.3d 941, 943-44 (7th Cir. 2003).
188 Id. at 945.
189 Reliastar Life Ins. Co. v. Keddell, No. 09-C-1195, 2011 WL 111733, at *2 (E.D.
Wis. Jan. 12, 2011).
190 Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990).
187
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evidence of wrongdoing—transferring those funds to a person with no
preexisting rights to them also seems far afield from traditional notions
of equity.191
The equities calculus may differ, however, where the deceased plan
participant’s estate seeks to recover plan proceeds through a constructive trust, because it is essentially doing so as successor-in-interest to the
decedent. On one hand, this might better comport with the federal law
on a theory that the participant also had a federal entitlement to the
funds. On the other hand, those who “slumber on their rights” are generally foreclosed from pursuing equitable relief.192 If the estate is successor-in-interest to the decedent, it is at least questionable whether the
estate should be able to benefit from the constructive trust where the
decedent formerly slumbered on his rights by failing to change the beneficiary designation. After all, the need for an equitable remedy only
arose because the participant neglected to exercise his right to change
the designation on the plan form.
CONCLUSION
Can a state law do indirectly what federal preemption prevents it
from doing directly? That is the precise and intended effect of UPC section 2-804(h)(2).193 If Egelhoff stands for the proposition that ERISA’s
objectives are limited to uniform plan administration, then 2-804(h)(2)
will likely stand. Yet, if ERISA’s reach extends to protecting income
streams for retirees, then 2-804(h)(2) is likely to fall. This is because
ERISA creates a federal property right in plan proceeds for participants
and beneficiaries—and no one else.194 Whereas ERISA suggests that
Congress intended to err on the side of the ex-spouse, the UPC supplants this federal rule with a state rule that errs against the ex-spouse
on a theory driven by a competing state policy.
Yet even if 2-804(h)(2) falls, the question remains as to whether a
court may impress distributed plan benefits with a constructive trust.
This remedy may be more reasonable than its statutory counterpart by
virtue of the fact that its imposition necessitates a proceeding to weigh
the equities of allowing the divorced spouse to retain the distribution.
Thus rather than replacing a federal rule with a state rule, courts seem
to be transforming the federal rule into a standard in those instances
191 See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 99 (2012) (“Equity will not permit that to be done by
indirection which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.”).
192 Cook v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 428 N.E.2d 110, 116 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981).
193 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2) cmt. (2010).
194 See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 854 (1997).

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2304.txt

274

unknown

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

Seq: 30

20-JAN-14

13:49

[Vol. 38:245

where the rule fails to carry out congressional intent.195 That is, in permitting a participant to deprive an ex-spouse of benefits, Congress has
expressed an intention that the participant choose the ultimate beneficiary. Accordingly, by requiring an affirmative act to change the designation, Congress embedded ERISA with a presumption that the continued
presence of an ex-spouse on the form is to be construed as an expression
of the participant’s intent. Paying the person named merely carries out
the participant’s presumptive wishes.
Because the constructive trust only applies upon a clear and convincing rebuttal of that presumption, it furthers the federal policy and
stands on surer footing than its statutory counterpart—despite the fact
that the application of each remedy has been largely justified on similar
grounds. Practically speaking, however, since the constructive trust is by
its nature a judicial remedy and the nation’s judiciary is far from reaching a consensus on its applicability, it is likely that this area will remain
exceedingly murky until Congress revises ERISA or the Supreme Court
defines the statute’s boundaries more precisely.

195 See generally Legal Theory Lexicon 026: Rules, Standards, and Principles, LEGAL
THEORY LEXICON, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/03/legal_theory_
le_3.html (last modified Apr. 15, 2012) (last visited June 29, 2013).

